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CANADIANS' OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIANS AND INDIAN ISSUES: FINDINGS OF A NATIONAL STUDY

BY

ROGER GIBBINS, PH.D.

AND

J. RICK PONTING, PH.D.

This summary report was prepared for The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs under contract number 770122, although the research itself was funded by The Donner Canadian Foundation and The University of Calgary.

Any interpretations placed upon the data represent the views of the authors and not the views of The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs nor its officials.

January 31, 1978

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CANADIANS' OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIANS AND INDIAN ISSUES:

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ABOUT THE STUDY

The data upon which this report is based are derived from a nation-wide survey of public awareness of, and opinion towards, native Indians and Indian issues in Canada. The original impetus for the study came from one of the author's conversations with a local Calgary Indian group. Their seeming lack of concern about the potential backlash effect which their actions might have upon the non-Indian population raised the question of the extent to which other Indian protest across Canada had already generated such a backlash.

As a prelude to answering that question it was deemed necessary to gather some more general, "base line" data on: (1) Canadians' perceptions of Indians and of the problems of Indians; (2) their level of knowledge about Indians; (3) their degree of general sympathy or antagonism towards Indians; (4) their reactions to Indian claims and aspirations; and (5) their perceptions of Indian protest activity.

In an effort to increase the potential utility of the survey data for such applied purposes as plotting strategy or planning policy, input as to the content of the questionnaire was sought from the National Indian Brotherhood, the Native Council of Canada, and the Indian Association of Alberta. With those same intentions, a seminar, funded by the federal Department of the Secretary of State, was held in Ottawa on December 12-13, 1977. At that seminar we, the authors, discussed the findings and implications of the study with invited participants from Indian organizations and support groups and federal government departments. This report is a summary of that seminar.

The study was made possible by a $40,000 grant from The Donner Canadian Foundation and a $5,000 grant from The University of Calgary.

The data were collected under our direction by a commercial polling firm using the questionnaire which we constructed with the assistance of the Indian organizations. Successive versions of the questionnaire were pre-tested in Calgary, Toronto, Montreal, or Chicoutimi, under our direction.

The sample, which is unusually large,[1] consists of 1832 persons aged 18 or older, randomly selected by professionally approved methods from among those living south of the 60th parallel of latitude from St. John's, Newfoundland to Victoria, British Columbia. Statistically speaking, a sample of this size allows us to make inferences about the opinions of the larger Canadian population which it represents, with very high levels of confidence -- or, otherwise put, with a very low probability of error. For instance, if we find on a particular question that

36% of the sample chose a particular response option, we can estimate with 99% certainty that if the question had been posed to the total adult Canadian population living south of the 60th parallel of latitude, 36% ± 3.3% would have chosen that response option. Stated differently, if we were to draw 100 samples of 1832 persons, in 99 of the 100 samples we would find that that response option was chosen by between 32.7 and 39.3 percent of the respondents.[2]

Respondents were selected through a multi-staged process, whereby first the city (or town or rural area) was selected, then geographical areas within that city (or town or rural area), then households within those geographical areas, and finally individuals within those households. This process of selection was random at every stage and therefore does *not* contain the built in biases of, say, a telephone sample. The only sources of bias in our sample selection procedure which affect our ability to generalize to the Canadian adult population as a whole are the following: (1) the possibility of differential refusal rates among different types of people; (2) the exclusion of the Yukon and Northwest Territories (and other areas north of 60° latitude) from the sampled areas; and (3) the exclusion of Indian reserves from the sampled areas.

The data themselves were collected through face-to-face personal interviews conducted in the respondents' home by trained and supervised interviewers. Each interviewer had a quota of interviews to conduct in accordance with the aforementioned sampling procedure. Four calls back were made before random, structured substitution procedures were initiated. Fifty-two percent of the initially selected respondents (before substitutions) completed interviews. A subsample of interviews was verified by each local supervisor.

The interviews themselves lasted about 45-60 minutes and were conducted in the official language (English or French) of the respondent's choice. Interviewing in English Canada was conducted during the period January 8, 1976 to February 25, 1976, while interviewing in French Canada occurred in the period February 12, 1976 to March 4, 1976.

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[1] The well-known Gallup Poll which surveys the entire United States electorate, uses a sample size which is only about two-thirds as large as ours.

[2] This margin of error is slightly narrower for response options which are selected by a smaller proportion of the sample, and slightly wider for response options which are chosen by a larger proportion of the sample. For instance, if only 7% of the sample chose a particular response option to a question, we could be 99% sure that the percentage of the total population which would choose that particular response option would be 7% ± 1.8%. The reader should note, however, that the margin of error is somewhat larger when we make generalizations from *sub*-samples to *sub*-populations (e.g., residents of the Prairie region). For a discussion of the principles of making estimates of population parameters from sample data, see Claire Selltiz et al., *Research Methods in Social Relations*, 3rd Edition, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976, pp. 525-6 and John H. Mueller et al., *Statistical Reasoning in Sociology* 3rd Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 197 , Chapter 13.

For the reader interested in sampling technicalities this paragraph provides further details. The stratified sample was proportionate by size of community of residence (five strata of city size, plus the strata "farm" and "rural non-farm"), but disproportionate by province, with Ontario and Quebec being undersampled and all other provinces over-sampled. However, when we report the data for the national sample as a whole, the percentages and relationships cited are weighted to make the sample size from each province proportionate to the size of that province's adult population relative to the entire Canadian adult population. Due to the importance of French-English differences in Canada we have also extracted two subsamples -- one Francophone and the other Anglophone. The Francophone subsample consists only of *Quebec* residents for whom French is the language most often spoken at home. The Anglophone subsample consists of respondents residing in any province (including Quebec) who cite English as the language which they most often speak at home. Six percent of the total sample, encompassing Francophones living outside Quebec as well as persons for whom neither French nor English is the language most often spoken in the home, is excluded from the analysis when we present data broken down by language subsample.[3] Weighting factors have been simultaneously applied to render the two linguistic subsamples (Francophone Quebec and Anglophone Canada) proportionate to their respective populations on the basis of age, sex, province, and language (French or English) most often spoken at home.

I. The Relative Importance of Native People to Canadians

To set the context for the detailed substantive discussion which follows, it is useful to first briefly address the more general question: "How much importance do Canadians attribute to native peoples and their problems?"

Although our data indicate that native peoples and their problems are not a high priority for most Canadians, the data also suggest that if politicians and native leaders could bring native peoples' problems to the attention of a larger spectrum of the Canadian public, then those problems would be relatively sympathetically received and would be assigned a surprisingly high priority. In this regard, subsequent sections of this report will discuss the current absence of any substantial

---

[3] Francophones from outside Quebec were excluded partly for statistical reasons. That is, their numbers are small in the sample. In addition, they are sufficiently different from one another and from Francophone Quebecers as to render interpretation of the results more complex had they been collapsed into a separate "non-Quebec Francophone" category or into the Quebec Francophone category. A somewhat similar rationale formed the basis for our exclusion of persons for whom neither French nor English was the language most often spoken at home.

block of antagonism towards Indians and the relatively low level of pejorative stereotyping of Indians. In this section, therefore, we shall merely report on two ranking questions involving native people.

Before the respondents knew that the interview would focus on Indians they were presented with a list of "five problems facing Canada today" and asked to rank them in order of importance.[4] Figure 1:1 shows that "the social and economic problems of Canada's Indians and Eskimos" ranked third in importance, behind "inflation" and "conservation of energy," but ahead of "greater independence of Canada from the United States" and "the rights of women in Canada." Figure 1:1 shows that although only one person in twenty assigned first priority to native people's problems, about half the sample rated native people's problems among their top three priorities on the list. Interestingly, and to our surprise, native people's problems were ranked higher than the rights of women, even among the women in our sample (data not shown).

Supplementary Figure 1 in Appendix 'B' shows that there is considerable variation across the provinces in the importance attached to native's problems. British Columbians and Manitobans are most likely to rate native problems among the top three on the list, while Quebecers and Maritimers are least likely. However, we shall observe later the interesting paradox wherein Quebecers exhibit high levels of sympathy for Indians even though they do not assign high priority to native problems.

The second ranking question was more specific. It too was asked before respondents were aware that the interview would focus on Indians. It presented those respondents (63%) who had heard about the planned construction of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline with a list of "five problems that have been raised in connection with the building of the pipeline." They were asked to rank the problems in what they felt is the order of their importance. The results were similar to those in the preceding question. Here the "protection of the way of life of the native people of the Mackenzie Valley" was ranked third, behind "protection of the natural environment" and "guaranteeing that Canada's energy needs are met before any gas is sold to the U.S.A.," and ahead of "guaranteeing that the pipeline is owned by Canadians" and surprisingly, "the production of energy as cheaply as possible." Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 show the priorities

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[4] To reduce response bias we varied the order in which the problems were presented to the respondents.

Figure 1:1

RANKING OF "FIVE PROBLEMS FACING CANADA TODAY," SHOWING PERCENT OF SAMPLE RANKING EACH RESPECTIVE PROBLEM AS FIRST, SECOND, OR THIRD PRIORITY



assigned to each and the provincial variation in *first* priority choices, respectively.

Presumably, if the first of these questions had asked respondents to formulate their *own* list of problems, rather than responding to ours, the problems of native people would have received lower priority. Our question, therefore, is useful mainly for purposes of guaging the salience of native problems once they have been called to persons' attention. Whether it is strategically wise for native leaders and government officials to attempt to mobilize public opinion on behalf of native people is an entirely different question. Data in subsequent sections of this report indicate that the Canadian mass public is currently characterized by low levels of knowledge and awareness of Indian matters and by an absence of both strong antagonism and strong support. Such a public opinion climate facilitates a "low-keyed" approach to meeting the needs of Indian people. In such an approach, Indians and government work in close co-operation with each other (as is currently being done at the federal level), without much public "fanfare" and without resort by either side to the politics of confrontation.[5] Thus, we conclude that from a strategic point of view, the current "modus operandi" between the federal government and the national Indian organizations is appropriate to the present climate of public opinion.

Having established a general context, we proceed now to examine our more specific findings. We begin with a discussion of Canadians' perceptions of Indians and of Indians' problems.

II. Perceptions of Indians

Inter-group differences can be perceived in many ways. For example, an argument frequently advanced when cultural differences between Anglophones and Francophones are under discussion is that group differences enrich the quality of Canadian life. Alternatively, it is not uncommon that intergroup differences per se

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[5] Of course, factors other than public opinion also enter into the decision as to whether to adopt the strategy of confrontational politics. For instance, among Indians the politics of confrontation may produce a more positive identity, social status gains and political gains for leaders, and a higher level of social and political participation on the part of the "grass roots" members of Indian communities.

are negatively evaluated, and that minority group members are disparaged by the majority simply because they are different. In this light, one objective of our research was to sketch in the perceptions of Canadian Indians held by the non-Indian majority.

The first question asked in this respect was the following:

"If we were to compare Native Canadian Indians with other Canadians, in your opinion what would be the major differences between them?"

Overall, 70% of the respondents mentioned *at least* one difference, although this proportion fell to only 50% among Francophone respondents. Within the national sample, 16% felt there were no major differences, 5% felt there *should be* no differences, and 9% failed to respond to the question.

The replies given to this question were frequently complex and difficult to untangle. Nevertheless, the great bulk of replies could be located within the eleven coding categories in Table 2:1. This table presents (for those respondents who mentioned at least one difference) the percentage of respondents mentioning each of eleven types of differences between Indians and non-Indians. Thus, for example, we find that 27% of the national sample mention cultural differences, compared to 22% of the Atlantic respondents, 43% of the Quebec respondents, and so forth.

While the meaning of most coding categories in Table 2:1 is self evident, there are at least three codes that warrant some additional explanation. "Cultural differences" was somewhat of a "catch-all" code, encompassing not only explicit mentions of cultural differences but also references to lifestyles, way of living, etc. "Personality deficiencies" primarily incorporates mentions of laziness, lack of motivation and lack of ambition. Finally, the code "government treatment" captures references to both favourable and unfavourable government treatment. Respondents were evenly split here.

Close inspection of Table 2:1 will reveal very pronounced regional and linguistic variations in the types of differences mentioned by respondents. For example, one might look at "personality deficiencies," perhaps the code most likely to capture prejudicial or bigoted perceptions. Here we find that although only 7% of the Quebec respondents mention such differences, close to a third of the prairie respondents do so. Interestingly, neither the respondents' age nor level of formal education had any significant impact on the likelihood of mentioning personality deficiencies.

Table 2:1

TYPES OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIANS AND NON-INDIANS MENTIONED BY RESPONDENTS

Percentage Mentioning Each Type*

TYPE OF DIFFERENCE MENTIONED	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES		NATIONAL SAMPLE
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
1. Cultural Differences	22	43	25	19	21	22	44	27
2. Educational Differences	19	24	26	24	30	26	20	26
3. Personality "Deficiencies" (e.g. Laziness, Lack of Ambition)	12	7	23	32	21	25	8	21
4. Differences in Economic Opportunities, Unemployment, Job Training	22	7	23	15	15	21	3	18
5. Discrimination/Prejudice Faced by Indians	20	20	14	16	20	16	23	17
6. Poverty/Living Conditions/Standard of Living/Health	13	15	20	13	21	17	14	17
7. Government Treatment	18	6	13	13	8	13	6	12
8. Geographical or Social Remoteness of Indians	11	13	13	5	11	11	11	11
9. Difficulties in Assimilation	0	4	5	5	6	6	4	5
10. Alcohol-Related Differences	0	2	4	7	3	5	2	4
11. Indian Appreciation of, or Harmony with, the Environment	1	7	4	1	2	3	9	4
Number of Respondents	147	186	267	538	188	1130	159	1280

* Percentages based only on those respondents [illegible] at least one difference. Percentages do not total to 100% due to multiple responses and "other" responses not captured by the eleven categories in this table.

Following the question concerning the differences between Indians and non-Indians respondents were asked:

> "What would you say are the *main problems* faced by Canadian Indians today?"

For the sample as a whole, 89% mentioned at least one problem, with the response rate being slightly lower for Francophones. The great bulk of the problems mentioned fell into the nine codes presented in Table 2:2. Thus from the table it can be seen that problems relating to prejudice and discrimination were the most commonly mentioned, followed by poverty and unemployment. As in Table 2:1 there are marked regional variations in the types of problems mentioned. For example, while 28% of the prairie respondents mention alcohol-related problems, this is true for only one percent of the Quebec respondents. Regional perceptual variations of this magnitude are perhaps to be expected given regional differences in the history of the Indian-non Indian relations, in the ethnic composition of the non-Indian society, in the geographical location of the Indian population, and in the rate of Indian migration into metropolitan centres.

The data presented in Table 2:2 give some insight into where respondents assign responsibility for the present condition of Canadian Indians. For example, respondents who stress problems such as laziness and lack of motivation may locate the source of responsibility or blame within the Indian people themselves. On the other hand, respondents stressing external problems such as the prejudice of the broader society may shift responsibility from the Indian people to the Canadian society as a whole. In other words, the types of problems mentioned by respondents provide some insight into whether Indians are perceived as victims or as masters of their own fate.

In this respect, it is interesting to look more closely at those responses coded as "problems with the government." Among Francophones, almost 90% of such responses mention the government as an obstacle or hindrance to the Indian people. This perception is not shared among Anglophones, however. Among Anglophones, government *assistance* is seen as the major problem facing Indian people, as only one in five mentioning the government saw it as an obstacle to Indian aspirations.

Respondents were also asked what they thought was the major obstacle to improving the overall situation of Canadian Indians. In decreasing order of frequency, the major obstacles mentioned were lack of education, discrimination, the need for better understanding on the part of non-Indians' internal problems within

Table 2:2

MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY CANADIAN INDIANS TODAY

Percentage Mentioning Each Type*

TYPE OF PROBLEM MENTIONED	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES		NATIONAL SAMPLE
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
1. Prejudice/Discrimination/Bigotry/Racism	27	51	36	31	44	35	51	39
2. Poverty/Unemployment	38	12	35	18	23	28	11	26
3. Lack of Education, Training	33	15	26	24	29	27	12	24
4. Problems of Assimilation/Reluctance to Assimilate/Forced Assimilation	10	29	16	15	15	18	28	19
5. Problems with Government/Government Assistance/Government Interference	17	18	13	20	15	16	21	17
6. Personality "Deficiencies"/Laziness, Lack of Motivation	10	5	16	18	19	18	5	14
7. Alcohol-Related Problems	7	1	13	28	12	17	0	12
8. Reservations	11	9	12	7	7	10	9	10
9. Organizational Problems Internal to Indian Movement/Leadership/Factionalism/Bickering	0	2	1	2	1	2	3	2
Number of Respondents	190	290	322	643	215	1342	249	1660

*. Percentages based only upon those respondents mentioning at least one problem. Percentages do not total to 100% due to multiple response.

the Indian community, the resistance of the government, government assistance, and government interference. In total, the three obstacles relating to the government were the most commonly cited.

Public perceptions concerning the value of Indian reserves are given in Table 2:3. The only additional comment here is that respondents with advanced levels of formal education were the *least* likely to feel that reserves help the Indian people.

The last question in this section addresses what we perceive to be a source of tension within the Indian community arising from the potential conflict between aspirations for an improved standard of living and the desire to preserve traditional patterns of Indian life. Respondents were asked the following question:

> "Some people say that Indians have to choose between either having a higher standard of living or preserving their traditional way of life. Do you agree that they have to make that choice, or can they have both?"

Nationally, 41% of the sample feel that a choice is necessary while 53% feel that Indians can have both. Regional variations are not that pronounced, although Quebec and Francophone respondents are more likely to feel that a choice is necessary.

Respondents who felt that a choice was necessary were also asked which choice they thought the majority of the Indian people would favour. In the national sample, 58% feel that the majority would choose to preserve their traditional way of life, while 34% feel that the majority would choose a higher standard of living. Francophones were more likely than Anglophones to feel that the majority of Indians would choose the former alternative.

In summary, the perceptions of native Canadians held by the Canadian public were seen to be complex, multifaceted, and marked by strong regional and linguistic variations. A sizeable minority of the public subscribes to stereotypic views of Indians that are unquestionably pejorative. In this sense, Indians are seen as lazy, lacking in motivation, factionalized, overly dependent upon government handouts, and facing serious problems with the use of alcohol. On the other hand, an even larger proportion of the Canadian public perceives Indians to be facing problems that are not of their own creation, such as a lack of economic opportunities, discrimination and prejudice, and, in the view of a significant segment of the public, an obstructionist government. Correspondingly, the major differences between Indians and non-Indians are thought to spring from the different conditions that the two groups face rather than from some genetic or racial source.

Table 2:3

"ON THE WHOLE DO YOU FEEL THAT INDIAN RESERVES HELP THE INDIAN PEOPLE, HINDER THE INDIAN PEOPLE, BOTH HELP AND HINDER, OR NEITHER HELP NOR HINDER?"

(Percentage)

	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
RESPONSE	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
Help the Indian People	19	25	14	16	8	14	[illegible]	17
Hinder the Indian People	30	28	36	32	35	36	36	33
Both Help and Hinder	29	13	35	37	44	36	11	30
Neither Help nor Hinder	12	15	9	7	6	8	15	10
Don't Know, No Opinion	12	18	6	5	6	6	17	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Respondents	220	357	354	677	224	1466	304	1832

III. Knowledge About Indians

Information describing the extent to which Canadians are knowledgeable about Indian matters can be useful for different purposes above and beyond the satisfaction of our curiosity. For instance, if a Dene leader were to hold a press conference in which he expounded at great length on the aspirations and grievances of the Dene, his efforts would be to little avail if less than 5% of the adult population knows to whom the word "Dene" refers. Yet this is precisely the proportion of our respondents who said that they were familiar with the word.[6] Presumably, advance knowledge of this fact would enable him to enhance the impact of his speech. Information on respondents' levels of knowledge about Indian matters can also aid in the interpretation of their opinions. Finally, such information can be useful both to curriculum planners in non-Indian schools and to those who may wish to mold public opinion into a more favourable configuration through public information programmes.

Unfortunately, the measurement of respondents' levels of knowledge is quite difficult in survey research. In particular, the choice of the individual items which will comprise the knowledge test is always open to debate. Therefore, the tests which we devised should be regarded only as approximate *indicators* of Canadians' levels of knowledge about Indians, rather than as *the* definitive tests.

In order to minimize the respondents' anxiety, defensiveness, and possible hostility, we attempted to disguise the fact that we were testing them. This we did by claiming that the intent of these particular questions was to check-up on the accusation that the mass media fail to give us enough in-depth detail about current social issues. In this way at least some of any defensive hostility which may have been aroused in the respondents would hopefully have been harmlessly deflected onto the mass media.

For the first of our two measures of knowledge we chose a technique widely used in the field of Political Science. Here respondents were presented with a card on which were listed the names of sixteen real persons involved at the national level in Indian issues, and also two fictitious names which were included as a rough reliability check. Respondents were asked to indicate which of the names they recognized. The results are shown in Figure 3:1, along with the actual wording of the question.

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[6] Interviewers were instructed to give both of the following pronunciations to each respondent: "Deen" and "De Nay"

Figure 3:1

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS RECOGNIZING NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN INDIAN ISSUES



Figure 3:1 shows that most of the names were recognized by only a small proportion of the sample. Indeed, some were recognized less often than the fictitious names (!) and the high level of recognition of Jean Chrétien is probably attributable to his visibility as Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce at the time of our study.

Recognition levels sometimes varied considerably from province to province, even within English Canada. For instance, over 90% of B.C. respondents recognized the name Dan George, compared to 48% of the respondents in the Atlantic provinces and 11% of the Quebec respondents.[7] In general, persons on our list tended to be recognized most often either in their province of origin or in the region in which they were most active (e.g., Judd Buchanan and Harold Cardinal in Alberta, Louis Cameron in Manitoba, Thomas Berger in British Columbia, and Lloyd Barber in Saskatchewan).

A composite *Name Recognition Index* was constructed using all of the names (except Jean Chrètien) which had a recognition rate higher than the fictitious name "Douglas Patterson." A person's score on this Index would simply be the total number of these eligible names which he/she recognized. The distribution of our sample on this Name Recognition Index is shown in Figure 3:2(A), while Figure 3:2(B) shows the average score in each province on this index. Figure 3:2(A) shows that over a quarter of the respondents did not recognize any of the twelve names, while only a tiny proportion of the sample recognized half or more of the twelve names.

Figure 3:2(B) reveals that in the sample as a whole the average number of names recognized was only about two out of twelve. Respondents in the Western provinces (especially Alberta) and Ontario tended to recognize more names than those in Quebec or the Atlantic Provinces (except P.E.I.). It should be noted, however, that the very low average score in Quebec would probably not have been so low if we had been tapping recognition of persons prominent at the *regional* level (e.g. Judge Malouf, Andrew Delisle, Bill Diamond, Max Gros-Louis) rather than at the Canada-wide level.

Our second measure of respondents' knowledge about Indian matters was also introduced in terms of "checking up on media coverage." We then proceeded to ask

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[7] For a detailed breakdown showing the percentage of respondents in each province who recognized each name, see Roger Gibbins and J. Rick Ponting, "Public Opinion Cartography: Native Peoples Issues in Canada," paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Quebec, Quebec, 1976. p. 14.

six questions dealing with the following areas:

(1) the percentage of Canada's population comprised by native Indians;

(2) the level of government which has the major responsibility for dealing with Canadian Indians;

(3) familiarity with the word "Inuit";

(4) familiarity with the word "Metis";

(5) the meaning of the difference between "status" and "non-status" Indians; and

(6) the meaning of the term "aboriginal rights."

Since four of the six questions called for discursive answers, a wide variety of responses was obtained. Collapsing these responses into meaningful coding categories which would differentiate different levels of knowledge was an extremely difficult and necessarily somewhat subjective task. Our coding schema, is shown in Supplementary Table 3, along with the percentage falling in each category in the national sample and in the linguistic subsamples.

We can construct a *Knowledge Index* using these questions and can compute a person's score on the index by simply summing his/her score across each of the six questions. The distribution of the total sample on this Knowledge Index is shown in Figure 3:2(A), while Figure 3:2(B) shows the average score on the index for respondents in each province.

In Figure 3:2(A) we observe that most of the respondents fall towards the low end of the Knowledge scale, just as they did on our other measure of knowledge (the Name Recognition Index). Only a small proportion of the sample received high Knowledge Index scores. In Figure 3:2(B) we observe a pattern of regional variation on the Knowledge Index similar to that observed with the Name Recognition Index.

A question which arises at this point is: "Who tends to be most (and who least) knowledgeable about Indian matters?" We have already noted the higher knowledge levels of Westerners. Our analysis also revealed, as we would anticipate, that the more formal education a person has, the higher he/she tended to score on both of these indices.[8] We also found males and Anglophones to be more knowledgeable than females and Francophones, respectively.[9]

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[8] This finding, and the fact that a person's score on the Knowledge Index was closely correlated with his/her score on the Name Recognition Index (Pearson r = .46, controlling for education), suggest that despite their crudeness our two scales are valid measures of respondents' knowledge about Indian matters.

[9] A person's age, federal political party identification, and the size of his/her city or town of residence all bore no relationship to levels of knowledge about Indian matters.

Figure 3:2

(A) DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES ON KNOWLEDGE AND NAME RECOGNITION INDICES





(B) PROVINCIAL VARIATION IN AVERAGE SCORES ON KNOWLEDGE AND NAME RECOGNITION INDICES





To summarize our findings on knowledge, it can be said that the opinions of most Canadians, especially those in Eastern Canada, are not based upon a very extensive foundation of knowledge about Indian matters. That knowledge about Indians which does exist is positively associated with higher levels of formal education, but we shall observe later in this report that the possession of such knowledge does not significantly predispose persons to hold more favourable attitudes and opinions towards Indians.

We proceed now to one such opinion area, that pertaining to Indian land claims.

IV. Reactions to Indian Land Claims

Over the past decade land claims have moved to near the centre of Indian affairs in Canada. Moreover, it is through land claims that Indian demands and aspirations impinge with the greatest potential impact upon the broader society. For these reasons it is interesting to explore Canadians' reactions to land claims.

Although the various land claims in Canada differ substantially in their scope, rationale, degree of publicity, and potential impact upon the broader society, we sought a set of general questions which could be posed to respondents across the country. We produced, in other words, a standardized set of questions which would not be especially relevant or irrelevant to particular regions within Canada, and would not (with one exception) be tied to specific land claims. While the generality of the questions is desirable for these reasons, such generality unfortunately also constitutes a drawback. That is, we cannot be confident that the outlooks expressed below in response to the general questions would necessarily apply to specific land claims.

The following question introduced the subject of land claims to respondents:

> "We hear a lot in the media these days about *land claims* being made by Indians. But since the term means different things to different people, I'd like to ask you a few questions about it and what it means to you. For instance - what percentage of Canada's land area do you get the impression that the Indians are claiming?"

It should be stressed that this is not an easy question. There is no widely accepted percentage in common usage in the mass media and even experts in the field would experience difficulty in formulating an accurate estimate. Thus, we are not so much concerned with the accuracy of respondents' estimates as we are with their general perceptions of the extent of Indian land claims. Does the public perceive

that a large percentage Canada is being contested, a small amount, or the entire country?

Within the natic sample, over two-thirds of the respondents would not even hazard an estimate as : the percentage of Canada's land area being claimed. Those respondents who did, r..ged widely in their estimates. In general, our data suggest that the vast majority of Canadians have very little conception of the geographical extent of Indian land claims. We might add here that to the extent that Indian claims encompass large tracts of land, the absence of such public knowledge is probably tactically advantageous to Indian interests.

The second land claims question dealt with perceptions of the motivation underlying Indian land claims. It read as follows:

> "Do you feel that when Indians lay claim to land in Canada they are *mainly* interested in the land *for its own sake* or are they mainly interested in it *for the money it might bring?*"

As Table 4:1 demonstrates, the most frequent response to this question was "land for its own sake." This response was particularly favoured by Francophones, which is consistent with the significance attached to territoriality in Québécois culture. A substantial proportion of respondents in the national sample also indicated that they felt that Indians are claiming the land both for the money and for the sake of the land itself, although this option was not presented to respondents. The regional variations in Table 4:1 are moderate, at best, with prairie respondents (led by Albertans) showing a slight edge for the money alternative. It should be mentioned, in this respect, that we have no evidence that the monetary motivation is any more disparaged by respondents than is "land for its own sake."

The next question probes whether or not the public is aware of the great diversity of issues involved in Indian land claims:

> "Do you get the impression that all Indian land claims are based on the *same* grievance, or do you feel that different land claims are based on *different* grievances?"

Fifty-one percent of the national sample felt that different land claims are based on different grievances while 30% felt that all claims are based on the same grievance. There was little regional or linguistic variation apart from a higher non-response rate among Francophones.

Perhaps the most politically relevant of all the land claims questions sought to establish the public's perception of the *validity* of Indian land claims. To the extent that Indian claims are perceived as valid, we might anticipate that the public serves as a potential, if somewhat passive, source of support for such

claims. Indian organizations may thus be able to mobilize public opinion as a weapon in their political arsenal, should such a weapon be necessary. Alternatively, if the public does not feel that Indian claims are valid, public opinion serves as a potential resource for those in the government, public service, private sector or foreign countries who might, for whatever reasons, oppose native land claims.

The question we posed on the validity of Indian land claims is presented in Table 4:2. When evaluating responses to this question, its generality must be kept in mind, for the question undoubtedly taps a general disposition towards Indian claims rather than a balanced assessment of all the claims personally known to the respondent.

The data indicate that the Canadian public supports the validity of Indian land claims. In response to the question in Table 4:2, 61% of the national sample replied that all or many land claims are valid, compared to only 35% who said that few or none are valid. More importantly, perhaps, only 6% replied that *no* Indian land claims are valid. As Table 4:2 illustrates, Francophones are considerably more likely to grant the validity of Indian claims than are Anglophones. Within the Anglophone community, rejection of the Indian land claims appears to be most conspicuous within the prairie provinces, with Saskatchewan respondents leading the way. In our data it is only with the prairie region that more respondents (51%) feel that few or no land claims are valid than feel that all or many are valid (45%). Respondents who are relatively old and who possess less than a complete high school education also disproportionately reject the validity of Indian land claims.

The one specific land claim that we did investigate was that laid by Indians in northern Alberta to the Athabasca oil sands. Across the country only 38% of our respondents were aware of this claim, a proportion that fell as low as 16% in Quebec and rose to 76% in Alberta. Many land claims are probably similar to this in their pattern of regionally restricted public awareness. In this case we find that even though the claim is to an energy resource reservoir which will be of central importance for most Canadians in the future, and even with national media coverage, public awareness outside the region of immediate concern was rather limited.

Respondents who were aware of the oil sands claim were asked what they felt Indians were tying to accomplish with the claim. When presented with a list of three alternatives, 59% chose the objective publicly stated by the Indian Association of Alberta -- to obtain greater Indian participation in the projects

Table 4:1

MOTIVATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF INDIAN LAND CLAIMS

"Do you feel that when Indians lay claim to land in Canada they are *mainly* interested in the land *for its own sake* or are they mainly interested in it *for the money it might bring?*"

(Percentage)

	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
RESPONSE	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
Land for its Own Sake	37	54	46	34	40	40	54	44
For the Money it Might Bring	33	17	27	37	31	31	19	27
Both	23	18	20	23	27	22	17	21
Don't Know. No Opinion	8	10	7	6	2	6	10	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Respondents	220	357	354	677	224	1466	304	1832

Table 4:2

PERCEIVED VALIDITY OF INDIAN LAND CLAIMS

"Overall, do you feel that *all* Indian land claims are valid *many* are valid, *few* are valid or *no* Indian land claims are valid?"

	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
RESPONSE	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
All Claims are Valid	5	18	10	6	8	8	20	11
Many are Valid	45	59	50	39	47	46	57	50
Few are Valid	41	13	30	44	37	36	13	29
No Claims are Valid	6	4	7	7	6	7	4	6
Don't Know. No Opinion	3	6	4	4	2	4	5	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Respondents	220	357	354	677	224	1466	304	1832

that are already underway at the oil sands. Another 21% of the respondents chose the alternative "total Indian control of the oil sands," while only 7% felt that Indians were trying to "prevent the oil sands from ever being developed."

The last questions to consider here are two taken from a longer list of thirteen statements to which respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement on a five point scale. The one read as follows:

> "Since Indians feel that they were unfairly taken advantage of when treaties were originally signed, the treaties should be renegotiated."

The national sample was quite supportive here, as 55% agreed and only 21% disagreed. The other statement was:

> "Where Indian principles of land ownership conflict with the white man's law, Indian principles should be given priority."

In the national sample 30% of the respondents agreed with this statement, 36% disagreed, and the balance were either indifferent or did not respond to the question. The level of agreement here is perhaps surprisingly high, as even disagreement with this statement is not necessarily indicative of opposition to Indian land claims nor to more general Indian aspirations.

The reason for the relatively high levels of agreeing responses and of non-committal responses here may be that this latter question poses a moral dilemma for some respondents. That is, the question carries less-than-subtle implications of cultural relativism, posing as it does a contrast between the Indian and non-Indian moral-legal systems. The latent message of the question may well be that Indians have as much right to their principles of land ownership as non-Indians have to their's. If that message is received and accepted by the respondent, it may generate guilt over the fact that non-Indian principles of land ownership have been imposed upon Indians. However, this interpretation is purely speculative and should *not* be construed to mean that *most* Canadians are caught in a moral quandary over Indian land claims. Furthermore, it should be noted that when members of the dominant ethnic group in society feel guilty about their group's treatment of other racial or ethnic minority groups, those guilt feelings may be alleviated in ways that are actually detrimental to the minority groups,[10] as the experience of the United

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[10] For instance, psychologists have found that dominant group members may try to discharge their guilt feelings by projecting their own negative feelings about themselves onto the minority group, thereby rendering the minority group "deserving" of the ill-treatment it receives at their hands. Another response by guilt-ridden dominant group members is to resolve the moral dilemma by simply refusing to grant the legitimacy of one of the positions — in this case, the Indian's position.

States shows. Thus, any decision by government or Indian strategists as to whether to try to capitalize upon non-Indians' feelings of guilt should, in our opinion, be carefully weighed in light of the possibility that the attempt might "backfire."

We have found that the public's knowledge in the land claims area is neither extensive nor rich. Furthermore, given the substantial differences which exist among Indian land claims, it is difficult to predict the public's reactions to specific land claims from the more general dispositions measured in this study. In general, however, the Canadian public appears more supportive than not of the general principle and strategy of Indian land claims. Public opposition to native land claims seems to be neither broadly based nor intense, and there is probably little need at this point in time to make a major appeal to any feelings of guilt which non-Indians may hold towards Indians concerning lands issues.

V. Sympathy and Antagonism Towards Indians

Thus far we have examined a large number of specific questions relating to Indians and Indian issues in Canada. However the very wealth and complexity of this data begs the answers to some more general questions. For example, *on balance* what is the outlook of Canadians towards Indians and Indian issues? On balance, are Canadians sympathetic or antagonistic towards the Indian people, their aims and aspirations? What types of individuals are *relatively* sympathetic or *relatively* antagonistic?

To answer such questions we must move beyond specific issues and construct a more general measure of respondent dispositions. Our tool in this regard is the *Indian Sympathy Index*, a composite index of generalized sympathy, or lack of sympathy, towards Indians and Indian concerns.

A respondent's score on the Indian Sympathy Index was derived from his or her level of agreement, or disagreement, with the ten statements listed in Table 5:1. (For each statement a respondent could agree strongly, agree moderately, neither agree nor disagree, disagree moderately, or disagree strongly). Responses to the ten statements were correlated to one another. In other words, a respondent's answer on any one statement could be used to predict, with odds better than chance alone of being correct, his or her answers to the other nine statements. As the ten statements were correlated to one another, an index score could be computed by adding together the respondent's scores across all ten statements. On each statement the respondent's

STATEMENTS COMPRISING THE INDIAN SYMPATHY INDEX

% Agreeing Strongly or Moderately

STATEMENT	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES		NATIONAL SAMPLE
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
The Federal Department of Indian Affairs tends to be more concerned with bureaucratic red tape than seeing to the needs of the Indian people.	60	60	66	67	80	68	58	66
Indians deserve to be a lot better off economically than they are now.	73	77	76	56	67	70	75	72
If a Mackenzie Valley pipeline is imposed upon the northern natives against their wishes, we can't blame them if they resort to violence.	25	34	28	28	33	29	35	30
Where Indian principles of land ownership conflict with the white man's law, Indian principles should be given priority.	26	35	30	24	31	28	34	30
At the present time Indians receive enough financial backing from the Federal government.	39	24	31	53	36	38	26	34
Since Indians feel that they were unfairly taken advantage of when treaties were originally signed, the treaties should be renegotiated.	49	60	56	46	58	53	61	55
On the whole, Indian leaders in Canada have demonstrated a lot of restraint in acting on their grievances.	52	41	58	58	67	60	40	54
Indians, as the first Canadians, should have special cultural protection that other groups don't have.	36	47	45	34	52	41	48	44
Most Indian leaders who criticize the Federal Department of Indian Affairs are more interested in improving their own political position than they are interested in improving the lot of their people.	35	27	27	34	24	29	27	29
Indian people themselves, not the provincial government, should decide what Indian children are taught in school.	31	53	31	23	23	27	54	35
Number of Respondents	220	357	354	677	224	1466	304	1832

Francophone respondents had a generally higher rate of non-response to these statements, thus depressing, relative to the Anglophone subsample, the proportion of Francophones who would agree with any given statement. The comparative Anglophone/Francophone "don't know, no opinion" percentages for the ten statements are as follows: statement 1, 9/15%; statement 2, 4/16%; statement 3, 6/18%; statement 4, 8/15%; statement 5, 16/36%; statement 6, 6/16%; statment 7, 10/40%;

score could range from five (a very sympathetic response) to one (a very unsympathetic response). Thus the total possible index score could range from ten (very low sympathy) to fifty (very high sympathy).

The distribution of respondent scores on the Indian Sympathy Index approximated a normal or "bell" curve. In other words, the bulk of the respondents fell near the middle of the scale, with very few respondents falling at either extreme. Thus the distribution of scores indicates a public disposition of neutrality or indifference towards Indian issues. There are very few extreme bigots, just as there are very few individuals at the extreme liberal end of the Indian Sympathy Index.

Figure 5:1 presents the distributions on the Sympathy Index for the Anglophone and Francophone subsamples. While the shapes of the two distributions do not differ substantially, Francophones on the average receive higher (more sympathetic) scores. Thus our general attitudinal measure confirms the pattern of earlier findings; Francophones demonstrate a more positive outlook towards Indians and Indian issues than do their Anglophone compatriots. It should be kept in mind, however, that Francophones are relatively less well-informed about Indian issues than are Anglophone respondents. The greater degree of Francophone sympathy may therefore result from a form of minority group identification with Indians rather than from a more acute grasp of the present situation of Indians in Canada.

In this light it should also be noted that, for the national sample, we found only a very weak relationship between knowledge about Indians and respondent scores on the Indian Sympathy Index. Respondents who were relatively well-informed about Indians were not, on the whole, any more sympathetic towards Indians and Indian issues than were respondents who were relatively uninformed. Knowledge per se, therefore, does not appear to induce a more sympathetic or supportive disposition within the general public. This suggests in turn that public relations campaigns to inform the Canadian public about the plight of contemporary Indians would show meagre returns with respect to a more supportive climate of public opinion.

The construction of the Indian Sympathy Index also allows us to investigate factors other than language and knowledge which may propell individuals towards one pole or the other of the Index. Four such factors - province of residence, education, age, and national party identification - are examined in Figure 5:2.

Looking first at province of residence, it is readily apparent that provincial populations differ significantly in their degree of sympathy. Not only do Quebec

Figure 5:1

Index of Sympathy

Towards Indian Issues and Concerns



Figure 5:2

MEAN SCORES ON SYMPATHY INDEX

BY FOUR RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS



respondents stand out for their relatively high level of sympathy - as the linguistic data in Figure 5:1 would lead us to expect - but there is also marked variation among predominantly Anglophone provinces. Outside Quebec, the highest levels of sympathy are to be found in British Columbia, while the lowest are to be found in Saskatchevan.

Figure 5:2 shows, somewhat surprisingly, that there is no relationship between the respondents' level of formal education and scores on the Sympathy Index. Respondents with limited educations are on the average, neither more nor less sympathetic than those with advanced formal educations. The age of respondents is, on the other hand, related to scores on the Sympathy Index. In general, younger respondents tend to be more sympathetic, although this relationship was reversed somewhat among eighteen to twenty-nine year old respondents. The highest average level of sympathy was recorded for the thirty to thirty-nine year olds, an age group which, perhaps not coincidentally, entered adulthood during the height of the American civil rights movement.

The last relationship examined in Figure 5:2 is that between scores on the Sympathy Index and the national party identification of respondents.[11] Here we find that Progressive Conservatives have the lowest levels of sympathy, followed by identifier with the national Liberal party. The most sympathetic scores are found among New Democrats and among the handful of Social Credit identifiers in the sample. The partisan differences, however, largely reflect the different regional concentrations of partisan support rather than the impact of differing party ideologies or partisan perspectives on Indian-white relations. Thus Conservative identifiers manifest low levels of sympathy in large part because they reside disproportionately in the prairie provinces. Liberal and Social Credit respondents, on the other hand, are relatively more sympathetic than their Conservative counterparts because of the disproportionately large number of Francophones among the Liberal and Socred respondents. Within specific regions, partisan attachments per se bear little relationship to viewpoints on Indian-white relations, with the possible exception of New Democrats who stand somewhat apart in their high levels of sympathy irrespective of provincial residence.

VI. Perceptions of, and Reactions to, Indian Protest

Over the past decade dramatic change has occurred as Indians have turned from political passiveness to political activism, intervention, and sometimes radicalism.

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[11] National party identification was established by the following question: "As far as national politics are concerned, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P., Social Credit or what?"

The early to mid 1970s were years which were characterized in large part by the politics of confrontation, as illustrated by road and railroad blockades, occupations of government offices, the armed seizure of land, and the Caravan to Parliament Hill, to cite but a few examples. Such activities were commonplace at the time we were formulating the present study, and, as indicated earlier, the public's perceptions of and reactions to this Indian protest were of central concern to us. In particular, we were interested in the possibility that Indian protest might generate a non-Indian "backlash".

Although Indian protest has waned noticeably, its resurgence is far from a remote possibility.[12] Yet a "white backlash" against that protest could have quite adverse consequences for Indians. This is because we live in a political system of majority rule and special interest politics and Indians by and large lack the political resources [13] which would enable them to withstand such backlash. Presumably , there is only so far that a government is likely to go, and on so many fronts, before it is unwilling to risk antagonizing public opinion any further. So, if public opinion turns hostile towards Indians as a result of Indian protest, the government may feel constrained in terms of how responsive it is willing to be to Indian demands. For these reasons we feel that it is important to determine how Canadians react, either in fact or at least hypothetically, to Indian protest.

As a first step in assessing Canadians' reactions to Indian protest we must ascertain the extent to which Canadians are aware of that protest. We measured that awareness in terms of: (1) the number of different radical tactics which respondents claimed they could recall Indians having used;[14] and (2) the number of names

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12 For instance, see page 6, footnote 5 for some of the benefits which the politics of confrontation offers to Indians.

13 Not only do Indians lack the force of numbers to be a majority themselves in most political ridings, but they also tend to lack such other relevant resources as territorial concentration, constitutional protections, wealth, and prestige.

14 Respondents were given a list of nineteen "different ways which minority groups can use to publicize their cause" and asked to indicate which ones they could recall *Canadian Indians* having used. From this list of 19 we formed a simple additive *Index of "Recall" of Radical Protest Activity* by selecting the eleven tactics which met either of the following two definitional criteria for radicalism: (1) the tactic lacked legal legitimacy; or (2) at the time of our study the tactic had not been used so often in Canada as to have become institutionalized. Scores on this index could potentially range from zero to eleven. It should be stressed that this index is simply a measure of *perceptions* of the *breadth or variety* of radical tactics used by Indians, rather than a measure of knowledge about Indian protest or a measure of perceptions of the *incidence* of protest activity among Canadian Indians.

of more militant Indian leaders with whom respondents indicated familiarity on the aforementioned Name Recognition Index.[15] On both of these two measures we found the levels of protest awareness to be quite low, especially among the Francophones. Although there were pronounced regional variations in the recall of any given radical tactic [16] or any given militant leader's name, these tended to off-set one another such that west of Quebec there was little variation in provincial mean scores on either of the composite indices described in footnotes 14 and 15 below. The only exceptions to this statement were (1) the Atlantic provinces and Quebec did score significantly lower than the other provinces on both indices; and (2) Albertans tended to exhibit slightly higher levels of familiarity with the names of Indian militants.

The lower protest awareness scores of Francophones compared to Anglophones are particularly interesting, for they persist even for the dramatic tactics "holding hostages" and "rioting", which had both occurred in Quebec. Thus, even when Indian militancy occurs in the Francophones' own province, it is apparently of less salience to Francophones than to Anglophones. One might speculate that in the realm of inter-group relations, the attention of French Quebecers is mainly commanded by English-French relations, French-immigrant relations, and by labour strife. With such competition, it could be that Indian militancy may not be able to command French attention unless the threat component of their message is both pronounced and aimed at the French Canadian *collectivity* (e.g. at the Quebec government as in the case of the 1977 protests of the Inuit of Northern Quebec, or at other major Quebec institutions such as the James Bay hydroelectric project). Data not reported here on our respondents' familiarity with the James Bay settlement tend to support this interpretation.

Our questionnaire also contained a question which asked respondents to indicate their assessment of the effectiveness of each tactic shown in Table 6:1, where effectiveness was defined for them in terms of "bringing about an eventual improvement in Indians' living conditions." The term "living conditions" was specified as referring to "such things as housing and health." Respondents were asked to choose between

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15 The following were treated as militant leaders for purposes of this *Protest Name Recognition Index:* Kahn-Tineta Horn, Harold Cardinal, Dennis Banks (involved as a mediator in the occupation of Anicinabe Park in Kenora, Ontario), Louis Cameron, and Ed Burnstick. In addition, the term "Dene" was included in this list, since at the time of the study it was closely linked with the Dene Declaration, a protest document which was quickly labelled by the press as radical. In constructing this Index, each respondent was given one point for each of these six names with which he/she indicated familiarity. Then, one point was subtracted for each fictitious name with which he/she claimed familiarity. Thus, scores on this index could potentially range from minus two to plus six.

16 For a listing of the radical tactics in the index and data on regional variation in the "recall" of each, see Supplementary Table 4.

"very effective," "somewhat effective," "not at all effective," and "a harmful effect." It should also be noted that this question included both radical and conventional tactics.

Table 6:1 reveals that tactics involving coercion or violence are not seen as effective in ameliorating Indians' living conditions. A noteworthy exception is the tactic of barricading railways and roads crossing Indian reserves, as perceived by respondents in British Columbia where this tactic has been used extensively. Interestingly, Canadians tend to be less skeptical of Royal Commissions than we would have predicted, and even rate such commissions ahead of the use of the courts in effectiveness. Furthermore, although there is little patterning to the variations along regional lines, there is a pattern to the linguistic variation. Francophones tend to attribute greater efficacy to the tactics in Table 6:1 than do Anglophones, although the differences are not always statistically significant.

We also questioned respondents on their perception and approval of the involvement in Canada of Indian leaders from the United States. Here we found that among those answering the question Francophones were much more likely than Anglophones to say that the involvement of Indian leaders from the United States has helped the Indian cause in Canada (49% vs 15%). We also asked our respondents what their personal reaction would be if Indian leaders from the U.S.A. were to become involved in Indian issues in Canada in the future. A surprisingly large proportion (over a third of the Francophones and a quarter of the Anglophones) classified themselves as having "no particular feeling on the matter." However, at least a plurality in both linguistic subsamples indicated that they would disapprove. (See Supplementary Table 5).

Having considered our respondents' level of awareness of Indian protest as well as how they perceive that protest, we turn now to a consideration of their level of approval and disapproval of Indian protest.

We asked respondents to 'put aside the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of each tactic' listed in Table 6:1 and to indicate the extent to which they would approve or disapprove of Indians actually using each tactic. The responses to this question are shown in Table 6:2. Here again [17] we find a rather clear demarcation between those tactics involving coercion or violence and those which do not, with

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[17] Respondents' perceptions of the efficacy of any given tactic were strongly and positively correlated with their degree of approval of that tactic.

Table 6:1

RESPONDENTS' ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS TACTICS

(Percent)*

TACTIC	ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES		NATIONAL SAMPLE
		ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
-Requesting that a Royal Commission be formed to study Indians' problems	Very or Somewhat Effective	88	86	81	83	82	83	85	83
	Not At All Effective	7	13	18	15	18	16	15	15
	A Harmful Effect	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
-Launching lawsuits in the courts	Very or Somewhat Effective	71	78	69	71	77	73	78	73
	Not At All Effective	19	15	24	21	21	20	14	20
	A Harmful Effect	10	7	8	8	1	7	8	7
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
-Holding protest marches	Very or Somewhat Effective	67	70	60	53	68	60	69	63
	Not At All Effective	20	25	31	36	29	30	25	29
	A Harmful Effect	12	6	9	11	4	10	7	8
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
-Occupations of government offices	Very or Somewhat Effective	48	52	44	47	48	46	53	48
	Not At All Effective	31	30	31	32	34	31	30	31
	A Harmful Effect	20	18	25	21	18	23	17	21
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
-Barricading railways and roads crossing Indian reserves	Very or Somewhat Effective	21	32	26	25	55	29	34	30
	Not At All Effective	36	31	32	35	25	32	29	32
	A Harmful Effect	42	38	42	41	21	39	37	38
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
-Boycotting private businesses	Very or Somewhat Effective	18	17	18	20	24	21	17	19
	Not At All Effective	43	40	50	50	57	48	39	48
	A Harmful Effect	37	43	33	30	19	32	44	34
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
-Threatening violence	Very or Somewhat Effective	13	11	9	8	14	10	12	10
	Not At All Effective	27	29	25	28	26	26	29	27
	A Harmful Effect	60	60	66	65	60	64	59	63
		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Due to rounding errors not all percentages total 100%. These percentages are calculated on a basis which excludes those persons who did not reply in terms of the four response categories provided. The percentage of respondents falling into the "Don't Know, No Response" category for each tactic is listed below, with the Anglophone percentage presented to the left of the slash and the Francophone percentage on the right of the slash: Tactic A, 4/14; B, 7/14; C, 4/12; D, 6/18;

Table 6:2

APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL OF INDIANS USING SPECIFIC TACTICS

Percent Approving (Strongly or Moderately)*

TACTIC	*REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES*					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
A-Requesting that a Royal Commission be formed to study Indians' problems	81	87	89	82	88	87	88	87
B-Launching lawsuits in the courts	57	73	65	62	72	66	76	66
C-Holding protest marches	56	70	54	42	59	53	71	57
D-Occupation of government offices	32	46	34	32	33	33	49	37
E-Barricading railways or roads crossing Indian reserves	12	20	14	13	27	16	23	17
F-Boycotting private businesses	18	12	13	13	24	16	12	14
G-Threatening violence	5	4	2	2	1	2	5	3

* These percentages are calculated on a base which excludes those persons who did not reply in terms of the five response categories (from "approve strongly" to "disapprove strongly") provided. The percentage of respondents falling into the "Don't Know; No Response" category for each tactic is listed below with the Anglophone percentage presented to the left of the slash and the Francophone percentage on the right of the slash: Tactic A, 2/6; B, 3/6; C, 2/5; D, 3/8; E, 2/8; F, 3/9; G, 2/5.

only the latter receiving majority approval. In that table it is interesting to note that three wholly legal tactics (A,B, and C) do not receive greater approval than they do, although studies conducted in Sweden and the U.S.A. reveal a similar pattern of substantially less than total support for basic democratic processes.[18] The table also reveals a tendency for higher levels of protest approval in British Columbia and Quebec, as well as a tendency for Francophones to exhibit higher levels of approval than Anglophones.

Following conventional statistical procedures, we combined respondents' answers to these questions on approval/disapproval of the use of specific tactics so as to form a composite index which we have called an *Index of Approval of Indian Tactical Assertiveness*.[19] It should be stressed that this does *not* measure levels of approval/disapproval of Indian radicalism, since the component items cover a spectrum which encompasses both conventional and the above-defined "radical" tactics. Scores on this index could range from as low as 10 for the person who strongly disapproves of Indians asserting themselves in protest, to as high as 50 for the person who strongly approves of Indians asserting themselves in protest. Although more respondents fell to the disapproving side (59% vs 34%), those falling on the disapproving side were *not* clustered at the extremely disapproving pole of the scale. The average score for the national sample was 27.7, which was slightly higher than that of the Anglophones (27.5), but markedly lower than that of the Francophones (29.1).[20] These distributions and mean scores lead us to conclude that although Canadians tend to be slightly

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18 Another legal tactic, "boycotting private businesses," may receive low levels of approval and a low assessment of effectiveness because it was originally introduced in the context of bringing about an improvement in Indian housing and health. Respondents may simply attribute responsibility for Indian housing and health problems to government rather than to private businesses, and therefore shun this tactic. For the Swedish and American data on legitimacy of protest, see Marvin E. Olsen and Mary A. Baden, "Legitimacy of Social Protest Actions in the United States and Sweden," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* Vol. 2, 1974, pp. 173-189.

19 For a presentation of the mechanics of the construction of this index the interested reader is invited to refer to our paper "English Canadians and French Quebecers' Reactions to Contemporary Indian Protest." At this juncture we merely wish to note that it would be desirable to construct this scale using only those respondents who indicated that they could "recall" Indians having used the respective tactics which go into the scale. However, when this was done much data was lost (due to low levels of "recall" for some tactics) and the results proved to be quite similar to those obtained when we included all respondents. Accordingly, we opted for the latter procedure, which yields an index based upon a larger number of respondents and is therefore more amenable to statistical analysis.

20 Although there was also variation in levels of approval across our regional subsamples, statistical analysis revealed that these were largely explainable in terms of variations in the relative proportions of persons identifying with one or another of the three main federal political parties.

disapproving of Indian protest assertiveness, that disapproval is not nearly so strong nor so pervasive as to be considered a backlash. This conclusion is, of course, based upon the assumption that our list of seven tactics constitutes a reasonably representative sample of the range of tactics (conventional to radical) that Indians have utilized. Resort to more violent tactics on a regular basis would invalidate this assumption.

As DIAND demographer Mr. Andrew Siggner has pointed out, high levels of off-reserve migration are creating large pools of frustrated and alienated Indians in certain urban areas, such as Regina. While this will not necessarily lead to urban riots, the potential is there. It should not be assumed, however, that such riots will automatically produce a backlash, for the riots might be virtually unnoticed, even by the local non-Indian population.

Further analysis revealed that scores on this index were *un*related to scores on either of our two indices of protest awareness, which is to say that increasing awareness of Indian protest does *not* generate a backlash. We did find, though, that approval of Indian protest assertiveness was positively associated with scores on our Knowledge and Sympathy indexes, but inversely correlated with age. In addition, more highly educated persons tended to be somewhat more receptive to Indian protest than persons with lower levels of formal education. Finally, among persons identifying with the three main federal political parties, New Democrats tended to be most approving, while Conservatives were least approving and Liberals were intermediate.

To recapitulate, we have found that Canadians have low levels of awareness of Indian protest. Much Indian protest is in little or no danger of generating a backlash, since it probably goes virtually unnoticed. This apparently includes even radical protest, as we found that none of eleven radical tactics were recalled by a majority of our sample. However, this would certainly be open to possible change if national opinion leaders were to suddenly focus upon Indian protest, which they have not done to date.

We also found that assessments of the effectiveness of various tactics are closely related to the degree of approval or disapproval with which respondents view the actual or potential use of those tactics. Not surprisingly, coercive or threatening tactics received low levels of approval. However, we concluded that there is no massive, nation-wide backlash against Indian protest.

While there is no nation-wide backlash now against Indians, the question arises as to the likelihood or likelihood of one in the near future. In answering this question it is helpful to refer to the work of sociologists S.M. Lipset and E. Raab on right wing extremist movements and bigotry. In their book *The Politics of Unreason* [21] they provide an analytical model of backlash which they developed inductively from the United States' experience. Although their model may not be applicable in toto to Canadian socio-political situations, it does provide one basis for making predications in Canada.

Lipset and Raab's basic thesis is that backlash movements arise when some social, political, or economic change in society causes some sector(s) of the population to experience a decline in their felt sense of importance, influence, and power. According to the thesis, that affected sector of the population seeks to preserve its status by reversing or stemming the change, often through political means. Generally speaking, the necessary conditions for such a backlash to occur are: (1) a period of profound and pervasive societal change producing social strains; (2) the development of an ideology which explains what is happening to those who are bearing the brunt of this change; and (3) the designation of a target group which is defined as being responsible for the forces causing the societal change.

Space limitations preclude us from considering these conditions in detail. For condition (1) above we invite the reader to formulate his/her own inventory of the major social, economic, political, and constitutional changes which are: (a) likely to occur over the course of the next ten years; and (b) likely to lead to status dislocation for identifiable sectors of the Canadian population. Having compiled such an inventory ourselves, we have concluded that at the *national* level Indians simply do not constitute a target which could credibly be held responsible for the change.[22] In each case, much more credible targets quickly emerge. To cite but one example, although Ontarians are likely to experience status dislocations as a result of constitutional changes to bring about a new accomodation between English and French Canada and between Central and "hinterland" Canada, Quebec and Alberta are much more credible as targets for blame than are Indians.

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21 Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab; *The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970.* New York: Harper and Row, 1970.

22 Within certain regions, particularly northern frontier regions, the settlement of Indian land claims may lead to an increase in the material standard of living of Indians. Whatever status dislocation of non-Indians does result, is likely to be confined to non-Indians in that frontier region. Unless those non-Indians enter coalitions with southern Canadian non-Indians, any preservationist backlash which they might generate is *not* likely to prove insurmountable to the better organized national Indian lobbies.

Also in the Indians' favour is their geographical and social isolation and their small numbers, all of which reduce their availability as a target nationally. Furthermore, we found that to the extent Canadians hold *stereotypes* of Indians, those stereotypes tend to focus on "cultural differentness," educational deficiency, the lack of ambition or initiative, poverty and economic deficiencies, and victimization by non-Indians. These perceptions do not seem congruent with a definition of Indians as a potent threat, which would be necessary for a backlash social movement to occur.

Finally, in the Indians' favour also is the fact that historically, Canadian political cultures have not contained *ideological* components which hold Indians responsible for societal problems.

Thus, despite the appearances of large financial windfalls in land claims settlements, and despite Indian claims to special status ("citizens plus"), we do not see a large potential for a national scale backlash movement against Indians. This is not to deny, however, that in certain *local* communities (e.g. Kenora, Ontario) the conditions may be very ripe for such a backlash.

VII. Conclusions

The major findings of our study can be summarized in the following ten points:

1) Indian issues are not a high priority with the Canadian public, nor is that public well-informed about Indian affairs. Both of these conditions may be conducive to the relatively non-public, non-confrontational interest group politics which seems to characterize existing relationships between most Indian associations and the federal government.

2) On balance, the Canadian public appears to be more sympathetic than resistant to Indian aspirations. Of equal importance, there is no evidence of any polarization of the Canadian public into supportive and hostile camps. Rather, the public seems more characterized by indifference and moderation.

3) While pejorative stereotyping of Indians is not uncommon, particularly within the prairie provinces, it is not the public norm.

4) At present there is no evidence of any public backlash against Indian protest. Nor is there much potential for any such national backlash in the next decade.

5) At the same time, the Canadian public adamantly rejects the use by Indians of coercive or violent means of protest. The employment of such means by Indians could seriously undercut pre-existing levels of public support.

6) There is considerable evidence that the Canadian public perceives the federal government to be an obstacle to the realization of Indian aims and aspirations. This sentiment is particularly noticeable among Francophone respondents.

7) Compared to Anglophones, Francophones display relatively low levels of knowledge about Indians, relatively low levels of awareness of Indian protest, and relatively high levels of sympathy for Indian aims and aspirations. The rather striking and repeatedly encountered Anglophone-Francophone differences may be explained by several factors. These include the pre-occupation of the Francophone culture with French-English inter-group relations, a Francophone sensitivity to minority group status that may be extended by Francophones to Canadian Indians, and a shared Francophone-Indian interest in minority group claims to territorial control.

8) Apart from the linguistic differences noted above, social characteristics of respondents such as their age, education, federal political partisanship, gender, and so forth bore little relationship to public attitudes towards Indians and Indian issues. However, marked regional variations were encountered throughout the study.

9) Individual differences in knowledge about Indian matters had little impact upon generalized levels of sympathy towards, or opposition to, Indian aims and aspirations. This finding suggests that any attempt to increase the public's level of knowledge about Indian issues and concerns is unlikely to substantially increase public levels of support.

10) The data on which this study is based were collected two years ago. Although we cannot be certain, we feel that our findings would not be significantly different if the study were to be replicated today.

APPENDICES

Appendix 'A'

INTERVIEW LOCATIONS

Maritimes

Cornerbrook, Nfld. (Rural)
St. John's, Nfld.
Borden, P.E.I.
Charlottetown, P.E.I. (Rural)
Fredericton, N.B.
Moncton, N.B.
Saint John, N.B.
Amerherst, N.S.
Glace Bay, N.S.
Halifax, N.S.
Kentville, N.S.
New Glasgow, N.S.

Quebec

Drummondville (Rural)
Hull (Rural)
Laurentides
Montreal
Charlemagne
Quebec City
Rimouski
Sherbrooke
Thetford Mines
Trois Rivieres
St. Paul Ermite

Ontario

Bracebridge
Hamilton
Kingston
Kitchener (Rural)
London
Oshawa
Ottawa
Owen Sound
Peterborough
Sarnia - Region
Sault Ste. Marie
Sudbury
Timmins
Toronto
Windsor

Manitoba

Brandon
Dauphin
Portage La Prairie
Winnipeg

Saskatchewan

East End - Shaunavon
Frobisher - Alameda
Moose Jaw
Prince Albert (Rural)
Regina
Saskatoon
Wadena area
Weyburn
Yorkton

Alberta

Calgary
Camrose
Edmonton
Grande Prairie
Medicine Hat/Lethbridge
Red Deer

British Columbia

Chilliwack
Kelowna (Rural)
Nanaimo
Penticton
Prince George
Vancouver
Victoria

Supplementary Figure 1



Supplementary Table 1

PRIORITY RANKING OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE PIPELINE

PROBLEM

PRIORITY RANK	PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT		PROTECTION OF WAY OF LIFE OF NATIVE PEOPLE OF MACKENZIE VALLEY		PRODUCTION OF ENERGY AS CHEAPLY AS POSSIBLE		GUARANTEEING THAT THE PIPELINE IS OWNED BY CANADIANS		GUARANTEEING THAT CANADA'S ENERGY NEEDS ARE MET BEFORE ANY GAS IS SOLD TO U.S.A.	
	%	(Cumulative)	%	(Cumulative)	%	(Cumulative)	%	(Cumulative)	%	(Cumulative)
MOST IMPORTANT	27.8	(27.8)	20.2	(20.2)	10.4	(10.4)	16.7	(16.7)	24.8	(24.8)
SECOND MOST IMPORTANT	24.9	(52.7)	24.3	(44.5)	13.8	(24.2)	18.4	(35.1)	18.8	(43.6)
THIRD MOST IMPORTANT	17.0	(69.7)	16.5	(61.0)	22.9	(47.1)	21.4	(56.5)	22.2	(65.8)
FOURTH MOST IMPORTANT	17.0	(86.7)	21.5	(82.5)	18.9	(66.0)	24.7	(81.2)	17.9	(83.7)
LEAST IMPORTANT	13.3	(100.0)	17.5	(100.0)	34.0	(100.0)	18.8	(100.0)	16.3	(100.0)
TOTAL (N=1226)	100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0	

Supplementary Table 2

PRIORITY RANKINGS OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION OF PIPELINE SHOWING FIRST THREE PRIORITIES IN EACH PROVINCE AND PERCENT CHOOSING EACH AS THEIR FIRST PRIORITY

PROVINCE	FIRST PRIORITY	% CHOOSING THIS AS HIGHEST PRIORITY	SECOND HIGHEST PRIORITY	% CHOOSING THIS AS FIRST PRIORITY	THIRD HIGHEST PRIORITY	% CHOOSING THIS AS FIRST PRIORITY
NFLD. (N=17)*	CHEAP ENERGY	35.3%	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	23.5%	NATIVE PEOPLE, CANADIAN OWNERSHIP (TIED)	17.6%
P.E.I. (N=30)	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	43.3%	NATIVE PEOPLE	23.3%	CHEAP ENERGY	16.7%
N.S. (N=65)	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	23.1%	NATIVE PEOPLE	21.5%	CANADIAN OWNERSHIP	20.0%
N.B. (N=36)	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	25.2%	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	21.5%	NATIVE PEOPLE	18.9%
MARITIMES TOTAL (N=148)	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	25.2%	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	21.5%	NATIVE PEOPLE	19.6%
QUEBEC (N=116)	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	32.5%	NATIVE PEOPLE	23.3%	CHEAP ENERGY	16.4%
ONTARIO (N=263)	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	27.0%	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	26.2%	NATIVE PEOPLE	20.9%
MANITOBA (N=161)	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	30.4%	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	24.2%	CANADIAN OWNERSHIP	18.6%
SASKATCHEWAN (N=177)	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	30.5%	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	28.2%	NATIVE PEOPLE	15.8%
ALBERTA (N=179)	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	27.4%	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	25.1%	NATIVE PEOPLE	18.4%
B.C. (N=182	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	31.3%	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	26.9%	NATIVE PEOPLE	19.2%
TOTAL CANADA	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	27.4%	CANADIAN NEEDS MET BEFORE EXPORT	26.0%	NATIVE PEOPLE	19.2%

* N = The number of people who had heard of the planned construction of the pipeline and were therefore ask

Supplementary Table 3

CONSTRUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE INDEX

	Index Score	% Total Sample	% Anglophones	% Francophones
1. "What percentage of Canada's total population would you estimate is native Indian?"				
A. One to five percent	+3	24	26	23
B. Less than one percent, six to ten percent	+2	16	16	15
C. More than ten percent, don't know, can't estimate	+1	60	58	62
2. "To the best of your knowledge, what level of government has the *major* responsibility for dealing with Canadian Indians?"				
A. Federal government	+3	56	60	54
B. Both federal and provincial	+2	19	15	26
C. Both federal and municipal	+1	1	*	1
D. Federal, provincial and municipal	+1	6	7	2
E. Provincial	+1	7	8	6
F. Municipal	+1	1	1	*
G. Both provincial and municipal	+1	1	1	*
H. Other, don't know	+1	11	9	12
3. Meaning of the word "Inuit".				
A. Eskimo	+3	13	15	12
B. Northern native, "Eskimo word", "Eskimo half-breed"	+2	6	6	8
C. Other, not familiar with the term, don't know	+1	81	79	81
4. Meaning of the word "Metis".				
A. French-Indian halfbreed, Indians of mixed ancestry (eg: "halfbreed", "part Indian")	+3	42	47	38
B. Non-treaty Indian, non-status Indian, non-registered Indian, native woman married to a non-native, Indians of Western Canada	+2	4	4	*
C. Other, not familiar with the term, don't know, no opinion	+1	55	49	61

Supplementary Table 3 (continued)

	Index Score	% Total Sample	% Anglo-phones	% Franco-phones
5. Meaning of the difference between 'status' and 'non-status' Indians				
A. Status Indians come under the jurisdiction of the federal government (Indian Act), while non-status Indians do not	+3	*	*	*
B. Status Indians receive government support, N-S Indians do not	+3	3	4	*
C. Status Indians registered with the government, N-S Indians do not	+3	2	2	2
D. Non-status Indians include native women who marry a non-native	+3	4	7	*
E. Status Indians live on reserves, N-S Indians do not	+2	11	16	3
F. Status Indians have treaty rights, N-S Indians do not	+2	4	8	1
G. N-S Indians include half-breeds, while status Indians are full-blooded	+2	2	3	*
H. Other, don't know, not familiar with the term	+1	73	59	93
6. Meaning of the term "aboriginal rights".				
A. The rights of the original inhabitants of Canada to occupy or use the land from which they made their living when whites first came	+3	5	7	1
B. The rights of Indians and/or Eskimos to control their own lives	+3	1	1	1
C. General rights of the first people here (ancestral rights, birthrights)	+2	12	15	6
D. Treaty rights of Indians	+2	3	4	1
E. The first people in Canada (no mention of rights), other, not familiar with the term, don't know	+1	80	74	92

Supplementary Table 4

"RECALL" OF THE USE BY INDIANS OF ELEVEN RADICAL PROTEST TACTICS

Percent Recalling

TACTIC	*REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES*					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
-Threatening Violence	34	24	44	50	53	48	25	40
-Occupations of Government Offices	30	27	36	55	49	43	28	37
-Barricading railways or roads crossing Indian reserves	27	24	30	42	86	42	25	36
-Displaying firearms in public	32	12	40	40	46	40	13	32
-Armed seizure of land	31	16	36	35	39	37	15	30
-Seizing vacant buildings	24	13	36	32	33	33	11	27
-Attending conferences to which Indians have not been invited	19	25	31	24	27	28	24	26
-Appealing to the United Nation to intervene on the Indians' behalf	20	28	31	19	17	25	15	23
-Rioting	21	15	29	26	17	25	15	23
-Threatening to bomb public property such as powerlines, railways, and pipelines	10	9	13	16	14	14	8	12
-Holding hostages	10	6	10	15	11	12	6	10

Supplementary Table 5

REACTIONS TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN INDIANS IN CANADA

A. - "Indian leaders from the United States have occasionally been involved with Indian issues in Canada. Do you think their involvement has helped the Indian cause in Canada, harmed it, helped it some and harmed it some, or neither helped nor harmed?"

	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
RESPONSE	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
Helped	10	29	15	7	11	12	30	16
Harmed	19	18	24	29	25	24	19	23
Helped Some, Harmed Some	26	10	20	21	25	22	9	18
Neither Helped Nor Harmed	17	11	22	23	22	21	9	18
Don't Know, No Opinion	29	33	20	20	17	21	33	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

B. - "If Indian leaders from the U.S. were to become involved in Indian issues in Canada in the future, what would *your* personal reaction be? Would you approve, disapprove, or have no particular feelings on the matter? Do you (APPROVE/DISAPPROVE) strongly or only slightly?"

	REGIONAL SUBSAMPLES					*LINGUISTIC SUBSAMPLES*		*NATIONAL SAMPLE*
RESPONSE	ATLANTIC	QUEBEC	ONTARIO	PRAIRIES	B.C.	ANGLO-PHONES	FRANCO-PHONES	
Approve Strongly	8	14	7	4	6	6	15	8
Approve Slightly	7	11	13	6	12	10	12	11
No Particular Feelings	35	37	23	27	21	26	36	28
Disapprove Slightly	12	11	16	14	17	15	11	14
Disapprove Strongly	38	27	42	49	44	43	26	39
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix 'C'

LIST OF PAPERS AND PUBLICATIONS FROM THE STUDY

Publications

1. "Public Opinion and Canadian Indians: A Preliminary Probe," *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1976, pp. 1-17. (Reports mainly on the results of the pre-test for the national study, as conducted in Calgary, Alberta using 215 respondents).

2. "Contemporary Prairie Perceptions of Canada's Native Peoples," *Prairie Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 57-81, 1977. (Condensed version of a paper presented to the 1977 Meeting of the Western Canadian Studies Association on the theme "One Hundred Years Since The Signing Of The Treaties.")

3. "Indians and Indian Issues: What Do Canadians Think?," Parts I and II, *C.A.S.N.P. Bulletin*, pp. 38-43, December 1976, and forthcoming.

4. "Indians and Indian Issues: Survey Finds Most Canadians Take The Middle Road," *Calgary Herald* (Background To The News feature article), September 3, 1976, p. 7.

5. "Attitudes and Ideology: Correlates of Liberal Attitudes Towards The Role of Women," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, forthcoming in Spring 1978. (Includes a section relating gender and linguistic group to attitudes towards Indians and Indian issues).

6. "We are Not Quite Alone," Part I, II, and III, *Environment Probe*, January/February 1977, March/April 1977 and May/June 1977. (Deals only with Canadians' attitudes towards the environment.)

Papers

1. "Public Perceptions of Native Land Claims: A Preliminary Report," Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, Quebec City, May 29, 1976.

2. "Canadian Public Opinion on the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, Native Peoples, and Environmental Protection," a brief presented to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry; Mr. Justice Thomas R. Berger, Commissioner, May 31, 1976.

3. "Public Opinion Cartography: The Native Peoples Issues in Canada," Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Quebec City, June 2, 1976.

4. "English Canadians' and French Quebecers' Reactions To Contemporary Indian Protest," Paper to be presented at the Ninth World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Sweden, August 1978.

Appendix 'D'

ABOUT THE RESEARCHERS

ROGER GIBBINS holds an Honours B.A. in Political Science from The University of British Columbia (1969) and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University in California (1974). Most of his research has been of the survey type, including his doctoral dissertation on nationalism, a study of nationalism in Calgary, and a study of "Western alienation" in Alberta. He is an academic referee for the Canada Council, an active member of the Canadian Political Science Association, and the author or co-author of several articles in professional and applied journals, including some (with Rick Ponting) based upon this study. Since 1973 he has been an Assistant Professor at The University of Calgary, teaching in the areas of Canadian Politics, Radical Politics, and Political Science Research Methodology.

RICK PONTING holds a B.A. in Sociology from The University of Western Ontario (1969) and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the Ohio State University (1973). Much of his research has been of the survey type, including his doctoral dissertation, a study of behavioural reactions to two accidental dynamite explosions in Alberta and Quebec, and a study of the attitudes of Calgarians towards Canada and Quebec. His other research experience includes a content analysis of editorials referring to government in an Indian newspaper. He is an active member of The Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association and the author or co-author of several articles in professional or applied journals in the field of race relations. Since 1973 he has been an Assistant Professor at The University of Calgary, teaching in the areas of Canadian Society, Race and Ethnic Relations, Collective Behaviour and Social Movements, and Sociological Research Methodology.



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